The World’s First Quantum-Resistant Wallet and Bitcoin Transaction

First Quantum-Resistant Bitcoin Transaction Using mask512 Derivation I just broadcasted the very first quantum-resistant Bitcoin transaction on the mainnet with a new dual-signature method. Here’s the transaction: https://blockstream.info/tx/143d47830c1d757583f9685396b2fb89778c47b9fc1c0d640b27bf01a366ded4 How It Works - Dual-lock P2SH: combines ECDSA signature and SHA256 hash preimage - If quantum computers crack ECDSA, the hash preimage is still safe - Needs 2^128 operations to hack (basically unfeasible for quantum tech) - Fully operational on Bitcoin right now no need for consensus changes Technical Details - Transaction size: 510 bytes (compared to the usual ~190 bytes) - Implements mask512 derivation: one seed generates ECDSA key and unlock secret - Script: <pubkey> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY OP_HASH256 <commitment> OP_EQUAL Code Stay tuned for the GitHub repo link coming soon. Would love to hear your thoughts! Feel free to share your feedback!

You should put the hash first, and the public key second, because then, OP_CODESEPARATOR can be used, to split public key from additional conditions, so then old wallets could sign it properly. For example: And then, it is spendable by "<signature> <data>", where signature can be correctly generated by many existing wallets, if you give them "<pubkey> OP_CHECKSIG" as a Script, and then, data can be attached even by manually inserting it into transaction HEX in any text editor. Wrong, because a malicious miner will know the solution, when your transaction will be flying as unconfirmed in mempools. You should think about something, which will require some effort, even if miners will know everything. For example: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=5557305.0 It requires only getting the private key, and making a successful double-spend with higher fees. And if it has a single confirmation, then it requires reorging a single block, which is currently something around 2^80, rather than 2^128. It is more expensive, than it could be, because you didn't use Segwit.

SCENARIO: Two Quantum Holders Battle ━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━ Time 0: You broadcast tx (1 BTC, 0.001 fee) Time +30s: Attacker quantum extracts key Broadcasts double-spend (1 BTC, 0.01 fee) Time +60s: You quantum extract attacker's key  Broadcast triple-spend (1 BTC, 0.1 fee) Time +90s: Attacker: quadruple-spend (0.5 fee) Time +120s: You: quintuple-spend (0.8 fee) Time +150s: Attacker: sextuple-spend (0.95 fee) Time +180s: You: septuple-spend (0.99 fee) Time +200s: Attacker: octuple-spend (0.999 fee) Time +210s: Mempool has 50 versions of same tx All from same two quantum computers Each outbidding the other Final fee: 0.99999 BTC Miner: "Thanks for the 1 BTC fee guys!" 🤑 NOBODY GETS THE BITCOIN! 😂😂😂

FWIW, P2SH vulnerable to birthday attack/paradox that reduce P2SH security to 2^80 towards collision attack.

Well, 2^160 for preimage, and 2^80 for collisions. But the first collision will raise some panic, because then, someone could lock things on "<pubkey> OP_CHECKSIG" and "<pubkey> OP_CHECKSIGVERIFY OP_HASH256 <commitment> OP_EQUAL", leading to the same address. Also, if anyone will move coins from 3KyiQEGqqdb4nqfhUzGKN6KPhXmQsLNpay or 39VXyuoc6SXYKp9TcAhoiN1mb4ns6z3Yu6, then it will alert everyone, that 160-bit addresses should be abandoned (or a different hash function should be used). See topic: https://bitcointalk.org/index.php?topic=293382.0

This is like a paradox! Bitcoin exists (miners mine it, there is a market where it is worth $100k) because it is secure and nobody can break it. If a time comes when it takes 30 seconds to break ECDSA the it would have had ceased to exist (no miners and no value) which means nobody would bother taking this 1 BTC in your hypothetical scenario since it would be worth $0

How does the mask512 dual-signature scheme compare to existing post-quantum approaches in terms of security guarantees and transaction size, and do you think it could realistically scale for widespread Bitcoin adoption?

Why do you think the pre-image makes it secure? When Quantum Computers achieve fully maturity, we will need to worry about the implications of Shor's Algorithm and Grover's Algorithm. Haven't you heard about Grover's Algorithm? https://arxiv.org/pdf/2202.10982 Applying Grover’s Algorithm to Hash Functions: A Software Perspective

The title mentions a quantum-resistant wallet, but as far as I understand, there is no "first quantum-resistant wallet in the world" here yet, right? So far, we are only talking about just one "quantum-resistant transaction". And even there, the discussion mixes two different meanings of the word "resistance": resistance as an additional cryptographic lock, and resistance as the impossibility of a practical attack. At the moment, the OP is only proposing resistance in the first sense. There is no discussion at all of a wallet that would actually allow the owner to keep their bitcoins in the presence of a quantum adversary. Or by choosing this title, is the OP implying that they already have a solution to that problem as well?

This is not really a quantum-resistant transaction, because you did not emulate some quantum-resistant algorithm inside the locking script. There are a bunch of NIST algorithms rated for quantum-safe usage, but you will have to design them in Bitcoin Script by hand, as none exist already AFAIK.